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Abstract
This article considers the need, when studying nationalism, to combine the analysis of the particular case with the status of the issue in 
the analysis of the generic nation/nationalism which brings us to the historical time when the study is being conducted. What stands 
out currently is the importance of the historiographic renovation spearheaded by a group of historians, sociologists, anthropologists 
and political scientists in the first half of the 1980s. And because of his popularity, E. Hobsbawm’s contribution particularly stands out. 
In a complementary fashion, it also advances a hypothesis on the reasons behind this historiographic renovation. The last part of the 
article focuses on determining the effects this renovation had on analyses of Catalanism.
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The study of the “nation – nationalism” binary fully 
enters this exercise-challenge which Huizinga posed to 
historians, since it has always had to manoeuvre between 
particular and universal knowledge, between the specific 
and the abstract, between gathering specific data and the-
orisation. On the other hand, studying it depends more 
than other topics on the interpretative and evaluative de-
mands that each civic body imposes and on the general 
ones determined by the historical dynamic.3
The perspective with which we can undertake the study 
of this issue is indebted to the era of the “demonisation” of 
national issues, which started with the end of World War II 
and the defeat of Nazi-Fascist national socialisation. This 
inheritance, which is so difficult to forget, was more recent-
ly revamped thanks to the historical turning point of stud-
ies on the nation that appeared in the 1980s. And the figure 
and oeuvre of E. H. Hobsbawm stand out as its most inter-
nationally prominent face within this new era. Much of this 
capacity for impact comes from the publication of his three 
volumes on the “long 19th century”: The Age of Revolution: 
Europe 1789-1848, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 and The 
Age of Empire: 1875-1914. This was a publishing project 
from 1958 in which the books sought to address a broad 
audience. Subsequently, Hobsbawm completed the series 
with The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 
1914–1991, which appeared in 1994 and generated at least 
one major academic controversy on the chronological lim-
its of this century of upheaval.4
In those books devoted to the 19th century, this author 
spoke at length about the advent and development of the 
It seems logical that with regard to the study of the gener-
ic “nation – nationalism”, we begin by considering the re-
lationships, similarities and interferences which may have 
existed on the international scene as well as those of a spe-
cific case, such as Catalonia, from the historiographic per-
spective of the Mediterranean periphery and the civic and 
political experience of an area like Catalonia, where the 
national factor has played and continues to play a crucial 
role in its historical dynamic and the definition of collec-
tive identities.1
Given the nature of this issue and this comparative per-
spective in which the general and the particular mingle, it 
seems appropriate that we mention the attempt to define 
what can be considered the historical activity performed 
in the 1920s and 1930s by the great Dutch historian and 
thinker Johan Huizinga (1879-1945), another individual 
pursued by the Nazis. He starts with the striking state-
ment that history is the form of the spirit with which a 
culture (civic body) realises its past with a style of its own; 
later he ventures to say that any history that has lost living 
contact with the national and international civic body, 
which does not take a passionate interest in the laypeople, 
cannot be a healthy history (he was obviously writing be-
fore the major crisis in historical reasoning that was 
sparked in post-modernity).2
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modern national phenomenon as a positive historical 
force, viewing it, like the good Marxist he was, in relation 
to the consolidation of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. I 
do not believe that Hobsbawm could be regarded as an 
expert in the study of the national question until the 
1980s.
We only know that in 1971 he participated in the mac-
ro-conference on national independence movements and 
the working classes in the 19th and 20th centuries, and 
that his speech highlighted the contrived language of na-
tional expressions, distinguishing between historical and 
non-historical nations (in a formulation that he seemed 
to be advancing in line with what would later be called the 
invention of the national tradition). Yet in the same talk 
he did not hesitate to stress how the essential aspects of 
historical analysis are the social and economic dynamics, 
and he cited the example of the contrast between agrari-
anism and industrialisation in the formulation of some 
national movements, specifically mentioning the cases of 
Catalonia and the Basque Country within Spain.5
The scant importance that Hobsbawm attached to the 
contemporary national question can be explained by his 
human, intellectual and professional background. Born 
in Alexandria in 1917 to a British father (who died in 
1929) and an Austrian mother (who died in 1931) – 
therefore, orphaned at the age of 14 after spending his 
childhood in Vienna within a Jewish family with Ger-
man culture – he moved to Berlin where, as he claimed, 
he became a lifelong communist (1932). After the rise of 
Hitler and the law on boycotting Jewish businesses was 
enacted in 1933, the Hobsbawm family moved to Lon-
don, and he started studying at Cambridge University in 
1936. Therefore, we should note Hobsbawm’s status as a 
cosmopolitan Jew, as well as an orthodox Marxist who 
never broke with the British Communist Party even after 
the crises of 1956 and 1968. Despite this, in his fascinat-
ing “autobiography” (which he published at the age of 
85), Hobsbawm presents himself with a much more ex-
pansive, heterodox image: he saw himself as an anti-spe-
cialist in a world (English-speaking) of specialists, as a 
polyglot cosmopolitan, as an intellectual who targeted 
much of his political and academic activity at non-intel-
lectuals, and, for much of his life, as “an anomaly among 
the Communists themselves who, in turn, were a politi-
cal minority in the countries I have known”.6 What is 
more, from his biography one can deduce the character-
istics that any good historian should have: “To devote 
oneself to history it is essential to have mobility, the abil-
ity to observe and exploit a vast territory, that is, the abil-
ity to abandon the place where one has roots”. And he 
drove the point home by saying that anachronism and 
provincialism are the two mortal sins of history, both of 
them due to an utter lack of knowledge about the way 
things are elsewhere, an ignorance – he said – that read-
ings or the power of the imagination can rarely over-
come: “The past lies in another country and its borders 
can only be crossed by the traveller”.7
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the cos-
mopolitan’s mistrust would be joined by that of the 
Marxist in his foresight with regard to a national phe-
nomenon for which he has no interpretative schema be-
yond viewing it as the reflection of the bourgeois hegem-
ony, mentioned above, which is expressed through the 
convergence between liberalism and capitalism and takes 
shape in the materialisation of the territorial nation-
state.8 In his entire rich argumentation, Hobsbawm in-
cludes information whose scope and significance are un-
even, referring to geographically quite remote cases to 
justify a single and rather linear argument. Yet he never 
ended up choosing between the supporters of the idea 
that a global explanation of the national phenomenon is 
possible and those who deny this possibility and only ac-
cept case-by-case studies. Likewise, he showed a great 
deal of confusion between aspirations for independence 
and ethnic particularisms and the (national and patriot-
ic) will for power displayed by the states in this period. 
Nor does he thoroughly distinguish between the nation 
meant as a community of citizens with individual rights 
who are open and tolerant of differences (religious, po-
litical, ethnic, etc.) and organic and autonomous com-
munities, and a closed society which superimposes itself 
over the individual and is expressed through a national 
rationale of state which transcends the individual inter-
ests and shows hierarchical social structures and authori-
tarian forms of power.
In any case, in all of these texts prior to the renovation 
in the 1980s, Hobsbawm does not show any interest in re-
lating his analysis with the reflections on the nation and 
nationalism which were produced in Europe between 
World War I and the end of World War II, like the analy-
ses offered by Meinecke, Croce, Kaegi, Huizinga, Namier 
and Chabod, to cite the most prominent. To be fair, how-
ever, we should also mention and consider the Marxist 
authors (Kautsky, Bauer, Lenin and Stalin) as well as the 
famous book by Georges Haupt, Michael Löwy and 
Claudie Weill, Marxists and the National Question (1848-
1914), published in Paris in 1974.
We have already said that Hobsbawm was one of the 
great historians of the 20th century; we should add that 
after he joined Cambridge he was a scholar who was per-
fectly cognizant of the dynamic of the profession. His po-
sition with regard to the major historiographic controver-
sies was always highly considered, such as on the occasion 
of the bicentennial of the French Revolution and in rela-
tion to the national theme that concerns us in this paper, 
and with the new approaches taken in the 1980s. Hobs-
bawm explains how he mobilised against the revisionist 
campaign which was unleashed particularly in France on 
the occasion of the bicentennial of 1789, bowing to a post-
modern vogue which, he claimed, ultimately reflected a 
counter-revolutionary ideology obsessed with diminish-
ing the importance of the Revolution in contemporary 
history. He claimed that it was a major campaign which 
harnessed the mass media to attack and discredit Jacobin-
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ism and ultimately to use it to “settle scores” with the 
French Marxism that was hegemonic in many fields (such 
as the university) until 1968. His theses were published in 
1990 in Echoes of the Marseillaise (again a reconstruction 
of one of his lectures), in which he lined up with Marx 
when he had warned the Polish in 1868 that “the Jacobin 
of 1793 has become the Marxist of today”.9
Hobsbawm’s analysis focused on demonstrating how 
the Restoration represented the triumph of the moderate 
bourgeoisie of 1789-1791, which always contrasted with 
the lower classes and was involved in a class struggle that 
was targeted against the proletariat in the 19th century. In 
correspondence, this proletariat saw Jacobinism, its lead-
ers and the sans-coulottes as the forerunner and referent 
of their struggle; they carried on in the Paris Commune 
and the 1917 Revolution. It could be argued that the issue 
fell outside Hobsbawm’s purposes, but the fact is that the 
only reference to the nation and its by-products is the one 
that specifies that in the interest of that moderate bour-
geoisie there was a desire not to exterminate the class ad-
versary but simply to generate a new overall climate that 
would take shape in modern national unity.10
The scholarly attention that Hobsbawm poured into 
studying the national question should be situated in rela-
tion to the major renovation that this branch of historical 
studies was experiencing in the early 1980s. This does not 
mean that the topic was foreign to him, as we have seen: 
he himself mentioned the studies by Carleton B. Hayes 
The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New 
York, 1931) and Hans Kohn The Idea of Nationalism 
(New York, 1944) as his major scholarly forebears.11 An-
other predecessor which he regarded with keen interest 
was the book by Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: 
The Modernisation of Rural France (1870-1914),12 which 
came out in 1976. Regarding the renovation of the 1980s, 
Hobsbawm outlined the most useful authors and studies 
who had most overtly stimulated his reflections: Miroslav 
Hroch, The Social Preconditions of National Revival in 
Europe (1985 for the English translation, which is when 
things started to exist); John A. Armstrong, Nations be-
fore Nationalism (1982); E. Gellner, Nations and Nation-
alism (1983); B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Re-
flections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983); 
A. Smith, whom he regarded as a necessary reference in 
the start of the modern scholarly debate on the nation, es-
pecially in his books Theories of Nationalism (1983) and 
The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986); and John Breuilly, 
Nationalism and State (1985, even though there is an ear-
lier version from 1982).13
Hobsbawm himself gave his own opinion on the cir-
cumstances behind this major renovation in historiogra-
phy. To him, it reflected the crisis in the national territo-
rial state, which at that time was no longer expanding 
after a continuous 250-year period of splendour, along 
with a context of general crisis in legitimacy that was af-
fecting individual loyalties. In 1990, he further fleshed 
this out by speaking about the nationalist surge in the late 
19th century, made up, he claimed, of negative, divisive 
movements thus centred on ethnicity and language (often 
combined with religion). To his mind, these ethnic reac-
tions were expressed particularly with regard to the rise of 
fundamentalism and its appeal to people for whom living 
in a “fortuitous” and “disorderly” fashion was unimagina-
ble, and who grasped onto whatever would offer them a 
complete, inclusive explanation of life and their commu-
nity while pinpointing eternal enemies against whom 
they could identify their own group.14
In my opinion, we should stress that this shift in the 
study of the nation and its relationships with nationalism 
was felt particularly strongly in English historiography 
and even more so in English culture itself, within which 
the strength with which ethnicity was revived in a West-
ern world which was thinking one step from definitively 
modern rationality, and which was shocked by the ease 
with which it could turn everything into politics and ac-
tion, was surprising. Thus, what was worrisome was the 
ease with which irrationality and “invention” built mobi-
lising, triumphant realities in an era in which national ag-
gressiveness had appeared to be permanently defeated by 
democracy since 1945. The omnipotent USA had learned 
this in firsthand when it felt defeated by the Marxist na-
tionalism of the Vietcong in 1973,15 and when the first 
major crisis in the system (the oil crisis) was unleashed at 
the same time, over the course of which nationalisms that 
had apparently been dormant in Europe were revived 
with at times rather aggressive tones (the case of Scotland 
would be a good example). And things reached a parox-
ysm in January 1979, when the Shah of Iran (who was 
supposed to bring about what was called the “white revo-
lution”) was toppled despite the protection and generous 
material support of the United States and Great Britain. 
An effective network dominated by the Shiite clergy, 
which ended up capitalising on the self-declared Ayatol-
lah Khomeini from his exile in the suburbs of Paris, de-
voted itself to appealing to the need to get back the moral-
ity and national feeling lost with the secular, Westernised 
government of the Shah, and this sufficed to allow the 
Ayatollah to triumph in a revolution that ushered in a 
new era in the Islamic world. Hobsbawm himself detract-
ed from its importance when he equated this Islamic rev-
olution with the first one of the 20th century, which did 
not have roots in the values and tenets of Enlightened rea-
son and its liberal, democratic or socialist derivatives; this 
was the underpinning of his theory that the nationalisms 
in the late 20th century had nothing to do with their his-
torical counterparts.
In the English tradition, as canonised by the Oxford 
Dictionary, nationalism is viewed from an eminently po-
litical and ideological vantage point as “devotion to one’s 
nation; national aspiration; a policy of national independ-
ence”. The English tradition had revealed itself to be in-
creasingly pessimistic regarding the evolution of a liberal 
system which had managed to generate pernicious forms 
of nationalism, and therefore rejected the possibility of 
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viewing nationalism as a natural phenomenon (national 
socialism could be viewed as a fleeting mental disturbance 
in old Europe). All of this has borne a heavy influence in 
studies on the nation. Thus, the new studies in the 1980s 
were closer to the understanding of the national phenom-
enon found in the continental definitions, especially those 
from the Mediterranean world, in which nationalism was 
equally considered an idea and a politics (so nation could 
be equated with fatherland) which was affiliated with the 
principle of nationality, although the nation was also re-
garded as a superior ethical, political and cultural princi-
ple which makes the grandeur of the nation the supreme 
principle behind political action.
This historiographic revamping from the 1980s largely 
dovetailed with considering nationalism as a strictly con-
temporary phenomenon. A few scholars (and sometimes 
even Hobsbawm himself) recognised the existence of a 
long prior period during which the elements were assem-
bled which would later take shape in the modern nation, 
and some even spoke about proto-nationalism.16 Accord-
ing to this notion of contemporariness, Hobsbawm 
stressed the concept of the invention of tradition (nation-
al tradition, as he did not apply invention to any other so-
cial reality, at least not with the same disparaging tone) to 
cite a variety of examples to prove how those national tra-
ditions which were presented as the oldest often had quite 
recent roots and were an intentional invention. Accord-
ing to this national invention, he was astonished at the 
speed with which these “poorly-intended” artificialities 
managed to take root in the collective imagination.17
Hobsbawm mostly agreed with the anthropological 
historian E. Gellner and his reflections on why national-
ism is a contemporary phenomenon: this social anthro-
pologist with French-Czech roots, another Jew who also 
joined English academic culture, did not so much develop 
a theory of the nation as a (non-evolutionary) theory of 
the processes of modernisation of Western societies in 
their shift from a farm-based economy in the old system 
to a more complex economy founded upon industrialisa-
tion, social mobility and individualism. Gellner stated 
that in order to resolve the new interpersonal conflicts, 
this model of society had to generate a moral framework 
of reference, a system that should be based on the evi-
dence that social relations could no longer have individu-
als with an identity defined by the place they occupied 
within the group but that each individual carried their 
own identity. In this individualised situation, which 
marks a rupture with the old system, cultural identity 
took on much greater value and therefore could not be 
left to free judgement or individual responsibility: culture 
and state had to merge into a single culturally homogenis-
ing action plan that would generate the modern legitima-
cy of power. He believed that the core of this new cultural 
homogenisation was nationalism, which was therefore a 
completely contemporary phenomenon.
The main critiques of Gellner’s theory come from the 
field of history, which deemed that the validity of a model 
was always subordinated to its proof through specific 
facts. Gellner had explained a mechanism applicable to 
societies in the midst of a swift process of modernisation, 
and the impact of his analysis was instantaneous and uni-
versal. However, it was clear that this theory could hardly 
hold up to proof by facts (especially with regard to na-
tional movements on the peripheries) or specific chronol-
ogies: how, for example, could it explain that the time of 
the maximum nationalist feeling in Italy, the Risorgimen-
to, dovetailed with a period prior to industrialisation? 
Hobsbawm incorporated much of Gellner’s theories into 
his work, and they both became the standard-bearers 
against the vision of a national phenomenon with remote 
roots in time. Thus, for example, “we cannot attribute to 
the revolutionary ‘nation’ anything that resembles the 
subsequent nationalist programme that consists of creat-
ing nation-states for defined groups according to criteria 
such as ethnicity, a common language, religion, region or 
shared historical memories, which have been so hotly dis-
puted by 19th-century theoreticians”.18 They considered 
the long-term dimension as the reflection of an organicist 
or even teleological vision of the nation (sometimes its 
supporters called them “accumulativist”) and were radi-
cally against viewing nations as natural entities or social 
entities, since they are cultural inventions or construc-
tions. Furthermore, they both shared the idea that the na-
tion is not what generates nationalism, but vice-versa. 
They posited that nationalism is a contemporary political 
and social phenomenon which never dated from prior to 
the French Revolution and which accompanied the Euro-
pean process of economic and political modernisation. 
On the other hand, this vision of the “need for national-
ism” in certain historical processes allowed them to asso-
ciate nationalism with modern forms of consensus and 
with processes of democratisation (the close tie between 
nationalism and democracy is one of the prime contem-
porary historical themes) as well as with the different 
ways power is legitimised which came to be expressed 
through the consolidation of the territorially-based na-
tional state.
These approaches opened up another sphere of reflec-
tion on nationalisms which partly revived the issue of the 
old distinction between civic (or Western) nationalisms 
and ethnic (or Eastern) nationalisms. This distinction 
had been written in stone academically with the appear-
ance of the Hans Kohn book The Idea of Nationalism: A 
Study in Its Origins and Background, a work cited above 
which Hobsbawm, as already mentioned, particularly 
spotlighted. This author, another Jew who was born in 
Prague but Germanic in culture, emigrated to the USA in 
1934 and alluded to a Western political nationalism based 
on pre-existing governing structures and grounded upon 
homogenous populations and bourgeois hegemony and a 
culture with Enlightened underpinnings built upon prin-
ciples like reason, equality before the law, constitutional-
ism and tolerance. He contrasted this with ethnic or East-
ern nationalism, in which nation and state were not the 
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same, and in which the cultural underpinning was in-
spired by non-urban intellectuals, focused on spiritual 
traditions, advocating borders based on ethnic demands, 
with strong irrational and mythic elements and historicist 
argumentations, as well as a strong component of xeno-
phobia. We can add that Kohn was also in favour of see-
ing nationalism as a contemporary phenomenon linked 
to the appearance of modern societies; he believed that 
nationalism draws all its justification from the past (lan-
guage, religion, common roots) and elaborates and trans-
forms them, generating a new reality that replaces that of 
the past.19
The division between ethnic nationalism and civic na-
tionalism has traditionally been attributed to the French 
scholar Ernest Renan, and partly to Friedrich Meinecke as 
well, when they spoke about political nations and cultural 
nations in 1907.20 Despite this, when Renan referred to 
the famous national “daily referendum” he added “if you 
pardon my metaphor” (which most editions omit); at the 
same time, he had no qualms claiming that a nation is not 
a simply aggregation of individuals but instead a soul, a 
consciousness, a “living result”. The referendum or desire 
to live together is not enough, Renan also says; the chain 
that connects the dead to the living is also needed, and a 
“national charisma” is essential, one fundamental ingre-
dient of which is history. Therefore, Renan’s precedent is 
not as much of a precedent as later claimed, when there 
were attempts to radicalise the distinctions according to 
the war between democracy and Nazism in the first half of 
the 20th century.21
Counter to this kind of simplification, one of the most 
important contributions was by A. Smith, later fleshed 
out in The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986). This author 
associated the ethnic or cultural perspective with the po-
litical and considered them inseparable in any nation that 
is entering modernity. Smith spoke about the national 
cultural community as a set of myths, symbols and mem-
ories which intellectuals elaborate to legitimise the nation 
and guide its politics. This culture or ethnic baggage, he 
tells us, is chosen, rediscovered or even invented by intel-
lectuals, but it has to live in and from the political circum-
stances which the nation is facing: real situations which 
help to explain why some inventions take root while oth-
ers do not. Ultimately, Smith believes that one cannot cat-
egorically claim that the French Revolution marked a 
turning point for the nation.
Hobsbawm stressed the concept of “invented tradi-
tions” or the “invention of tradition” (a term which is not 
his own but which he helped to spread definitively), a 
sphere of analysis which was shared by the majority of au-
thors in the 1980s renovation to some extent. Hobsbawm, 
who distinguished between tradition, custom and con-
vention or routine, undertook a sweeping methodological 
and conceptual reflection on the issue. To him, inventing 
tradition was a process of formalisation and ritualisation, 
the most interesting part of which was seeing how materi-
als from the past were used to achieve new objectives. He 
distinguished between three types of invented traditions: 
those that establish or symbolise social cohesion or group 
belonging; those that legitimise institutions, status or re-
lations of authority; and those that guide socialisation, in-
culcate beliefs and impose value systems or conventional 
behavioural guidelines. Apart from these categories, he 
said that these inventions are fictitious by definition, are 
symbolic or ritual in nature, and are made up of rules that 
are either openly or tacitly accepted, which are enforced 
by repetition.22
According to Hobsbawm, inventions were characteris-
tics of societies weakened by major transformations 
which rendered the now-dysfunctional traditions invent-
ed for the old social structures obsolete.23 He also stressed 
the paradox that modern nations are precisely presented 
as the opposite of novelty, seeking their origins in the 
most remote antiquity and defining themselves as natural 
(not artificial), to such an extent that they need no other 
justification other than their very affirmation. In contrast, 
he claims that everything that refers to the nation must 
have a component that was invented relatively recently.24 
These processes, he goes on, have sparked lively contro-
versies among historians, especially the attacks on those 
historians who are blamed for being the conscious or un-
conscious agents of the invention and distortion of the 
past in a task that transcends specialised research to be-
come an affair in the public sphere related to individuals 
as political agents. Counter to them are the historians 
who, beyond researching the inventions of traditions as a 
fundamental subject of study in order to understand the 
nation and nationalism, focus their work on condemning 
what they regard as their (traitorous) professional col-
leagues’ poor practices: they could be called “mythopho-
bic” or “mythicidic” historians.
More specifically, Hobsbawm focuses on the inven-
tions from the period 1870-1914, “standardising tradi-
tions” for which he blamed the governments in their po-
litical effort to integrate the masses by unscrupulously 
using irrational elements to decisively maintain the social 
order. He assigned much of the direct responsibility for 
this manipulation on the increasingly large mass of civil 
servants, and especially the administrators and teachers 
in compulsory public education.25
Hobsbawm focused his efforts on the emergence of 
mass politics and the increasing use of irrational ele-
ments; he made it dovetail with the intellectual crisis of 
classic liberalism, with the rising bourgeois reaction to so-
cial fears (lasting effects of the Commune of Paris), and 
with the need to undertake a formal democratisation of 
the exercise of power. Therefore, it was necessary to cre-
ate a new “civil religion” of the state (here he cites the ma-
jor themes analysed by Émile Durkheim) and this state 
would rely on “invention” and would reinforce it by pro-
moting imagery and public monuments, national festi-
vals, national symbols, major patriotic ceremonies, the 
intentional distribution of the main public buildings, an-
thems and patriotic songs, etc. In fact, it could not be de-
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nied that the sacralisation of politics was rooted in the 
Enlightenment and represented one of the expressions of 
modernity; what the emergence of mass society did was 
only to speed up the process and cast it in relation to the 
process of the nationalisation of the masses.26
Because of the nature of his work, Benedict Anderson 
could be another of the renovators cited by Hobsbawm as 
a referent, as we have seen, who may have exerted a cer-
tain influence on scholars studying Catalonia. He also 
subscribed to historical materialism,27 although much 
more cautiously in his analysis of the national question, as 
well as in his assessment of the role that this nationalism 
may play today. He claimed that the end of the era of na-
tionalism, so often heralded, is not even remotely in view. 
He also recognised that there is no acceptable theory on 
nationalism, which to him became an uncomfortable 
anomaly for Marxism. His interest in nationalism was 
crucial to his historical-anthropological work (we already 
know that this is not true of Hobsbawm), and even though 
he believed that nationalism was a new phenomenon 
linked to the liberal revolutionary process, his studies on 
major cultural complexes from the ancient world con-
firmed that in all of them he found a written (sacred) lan-
guage, a codified world of signs (related to the major cul-
tivated languages: Chinese, Latin, Arabic) and, despite the 
evidence of inequalities, the desire to present the commu-
nity as horizontal, including all its members.
Anderson’s analysis was based on the affirmation that 
nationalism is not an ideology; thus, it must be studied in 
an anthropological spirit within the same category as kin-
ship and religion, as an “imagined community” both indi-
vidually and collectively and ultimately one that is imag-
ined as sovereign, since its modern birth dovetailed with 
the process of destroying the monarchies with divine ori-
gins and the decline of religious thinking (which would be 
replaced precisely by national sentiment).
Anderson claimed that the major cultural complexes of 
the ancient world and their universal meaning began to 
be diluted in around the late Middle Ages; in the dynastic 
monarchies, sovereignty is defined by its centres, while 
the borders were rather imprecise and inconsequential, so 
the empires could retain power over highly heterogene-
ous and at times not even contiguous peoples. This situa-
tion was associated with a conception of territoriality in 
which cosmology and history were confounded. Howev-
er, it did not withstand the impact of a period determined 
by economic and social change, scientific discoveries and 
the development of communications. The spirit of Lu-
ther’s Reformation, which brought vernacular languages 
to the people, along with the printing press, went far to 
facilitate the change in communities’ internal relations, 
and all of these changes reached broader audiences (nov-
els, newspapers, pamphlets, etc.) in the 18th century. To 
Anderson, it is clear that we should bear in mind the path-
way embarked upon by the Reformation, the printing 
press, the new communications and the administrative 
reform, as they all paved the way for the modern nation.28
Even though he was not cited by Hobsbawm as part of 
the group of renovators in the 1980s, we should mention 
Hagen Schulze here because he was an expert in the his-
tory of the modern state (a disciple of Otto Hintze) and 
comparative European nationalisms. Hobsbawm’s 
“omission” of him is likely a politically correct reflection 
of the dismissal of a colleague who aligned with Ernst 
Nolte’s relativist position in the German revisionist con-
troversy regarding the Holocaust in the 1980s.29 Schulze 
claimed that the concept of nation is very ancient, pre-
dating the concept of the state, but that at that time it did 
not encompass all the members of the nationality since it 
was used to identify birth: nationes or tribes lacking dis-
tinct institutions. Similar to Anderson’s thesis, he be-
lieved that the modern phenomenon of nationality was 
very heterogenous – and therefore difficult to study in a 
unitary fashion – and that it began to coalesce in contact 
with the establishment of vernacular languages and the 
increase in communications and population movements 
(which revealed the existence of the “foreigner”). From 
the French Revolution to the Great War, the concept of 
nation, he claims, experienced a fundamental shift, since 
it ceased to be an affair of the elites to begin to interest 
the masses in a process that was historically as swift and 
far-reaching as it was difficult for political systems forced 
to find new forms of legitimacy to digest. His compara-
tive, longitudinal study allowed Schulze to see how the 
idea of nation gradually became functional, since given 
the magnitude of the changes, it incorporated the ideas 
of orientation, community and transcendence into the 
life of the nationality along with a major simplification in 
internal and external or inter-state social relations. He 
defined nationalism as the secular religion of the indus-
trial age. Like Anderson, and largely counter to Hobs-
bawm, Schulze also conferred a strong emotional com-
ponent on nationalism, and he thus also considered the 
invention of traditions. However, they both thought that 
invention should be given positive connotations, involv-
ing creation and imagination instead of only the creation 
of a falsehood, given that the entire community must be 
thought of by its members, so it cannot be judged by 
falsehood but by the way it is imagined.
In his list, Hobsbawm did stress the case of the English 
scholar John Breuilly, an expert in nationalism and eth-
nicity (in 2013 he published Nationalism and National 
Unification in Europe in the 19th Century). Just like Hob-
sbawm, Breuilly also came from a progressive, critical 
vantage point, but he focused his analysis on the historical 
perspective of the new relationships forged between na-
tionalism, the state and modernity. Thus, partly along 
Gellner’s lines, he also recognised nationalism and the na-
tion as modern phenomena and deemed the fact that they 
may have had a pre-modern history as irrelevant. He was 
essentially concerned with nationalism as a political form 
and its effort to conquer the state, and he viewed the com-
parative historical perspective and political history as a 
way of objectivising the subjective definitions given by 
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the nationalists in their action to exert power via the state. 
He established three conditions upon which the defini-
tion of nation and national actions are grounded: the na-
tion must exist as an explicit, unique entity, the values and 
interests of this nation cannot have priority over any oth-
er value or interest, and the nation must be as independ-
ent as possible, which assumes the attainment of political 
sovereignty.
To Breuilly, the essential factor was analysing the na-
tionalist desire to achieve a state of its own because of the 
existence of a unique culture (race, religion, language, 
background, etc.) harnessed for political strategy. Thus, 
nationalism should be capable of transforming culturally 
distinct human groups into homogeneous body politics 
characterised by the action of conscious minorities (most 
notably the action of intellectuals and professionals) who 
use nationalism as a tool of cohesion, propaganda and 
pressure. In the historical perspective, he considered dif-
ferent kinds of nationalist politics: nationalisms revolving 
around European separation or unification during the 
19th century; fascist nationalism; nationalism as a mod-
ernising reaction (Japan, Turkey, China); anticolonial 
and antiimperialist nationalism, and the separatist na-
tionalism of the 20th century in developed countries, 
which display an incoherent mix between democratic and 
anti-democratic values and are often responses to short-
comings or centralising and standardising drives from 
the state with which they are associated.
Breuilly also grappled with the origin of modern na-
tionalism and the contrast between liberals’ view of the 
nation as a universal subject of sovereignty and the “reac-
tionary” vision which starts with the cultural nation, con-
sidered a unique cultural entity. And he resembles the 
discourse of other authors by deeming that the indisput-
able success of this nationalism lies in individuals’ need to 
react to the increasing momentum of modernisation and 
the fierce individual competition it sparks. Therefore, na-
tionalism would meet individuals’ psychological need to 
seek refuge in the superior identity of the group, repre-
sented via an accessible simplification of purposes and 
promoted via the constant repetition of arguments, stere-
otypes and symbols which thus become unquestionable 
realities.
We should spotlight Miroslav Hroch, whom Hobs-
bawm cites first because what was translated in 1985 was 
an old study from 1968 that was expanded in 1973. 
Hroch’s perspective is interesting because it is not English 
but Central European, peripheral and tailored to a region 
with a strong romantic substrate: he himself criticises the 
English for viewing nationalism as an overly neutral term 
instead of seeing all the dimensions in specific historical 
processes. His peripheral study led him to establish a 
three-phase rhythm in the contemporary national revival 
which is reminiscent of the case of Catalonia: first, the ro-
mantic rediscovery of the people, with no political agen-
da; secondly, the appearance of a group of intellectuals 
who take advantage of it, backed by prior history, and 
start political-cultural agitation, giving rise to cultural in-
stitutions to defend the ethnic exceptionality itself; and 
thirdly, a cultural movement connected to the masses 
with national political parties that have clear political 
goals. Whether or not it achieves its own state depends on 
specific historical circumstances, given that the nation is 
not an eternal category but instead the product of a com-
plex historical process in which social groups are estab-
lished via the combination of objective relations (notice 
the adjective: as opposed to imagined relations): econom-
ic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographic and 
historical ones that are expressed in the creation of a col-
lective consciousness. In all of them, the author finds the 
existence of a shared memory of the past which is viewed 
as the group’s destiny, the presence of cultural and lin-
guistic ties inside the group, and the egalitarian awareness 
of its members.
It should be noted that in the 1990s, Hobsbawm re-
flected on the issue of identities in what seems like a sum-
mary and update of his analysis of the nation and nation-
alism.30 Similar to the evolution in the research, we can 
notice a kind of paradigm shift, since he abandoned the 
issue of invention and replaced it with identity. Despite 
this, if we carefully read the content, we realise that this 
shift is only due to his desire to discredit nationalism in its 
harmful interference in the course of the 20th century. He 
focused his disparagement on the conviction that belong-
ing to a human group is an issue of context and social 
definition (which normally takes place via exclusion); 
Hobsbawm viewed the definition of group belonging 
which prioritises it over all other forms of identification 
as a way of forcing things, since we are all multidimen-
sional by definition. In parallel, he went on to state that 
the majority affiliation of the individual identity in a ter-
ritorial national state was a new phenomenon of the 20th 
century, unknown in Europe in the mid-18th century, 
and that during the 20th century this affiliation had taken 
on sinister tones when the state had tried to get all its citi-
zens to be part of the same community united by a single 
ethnicity (thus interchanging the concepts of state and 
nation). The problems appeared when politics was de-
mocratised and had to mobilise these masses: the people 
had to become a homogeneous whole. Hobsbawm gener-
alises within his scheme by claiming that all states (except 
Portugal) were heterogeneous without major problems, 
citing the oversimplified example (as proven by Pierre Vi-
lar in relation to the advent of the modern concept of na-
tion) of the Spanish national cooperation of the Basques, 
Galicians and Catalans in the fight against Napoleon’s 
troops.
Hobsbawm explains that human groups have always 
been recognised as such by conferring a name and unique 
features on their members; he also claims that ethnicity is 
not positive trait of groups because what it seeks is radical 
differentiation from others via fictitious, arbitrary and his-
torically changing definitions. Some nationalisms (let us 
use the example of Catalan nationalism) encourage the as-
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similation of immigrant members and thus contradict the 
very underpinnings (pure and unique) of their ethnic justi-
fication. However, what the majority seek is to define an 
essential (“natural”) and exclusive identity to form a group 
and radically separate from the outside world (as is well 
known, one of his prime bones of contention was Islamic 
fundamentalism). Hobsbawm also considered the preten-
sion that each nation has the right to form its own sover-
eign state “a totally unreal principle”, since this would only 
become an operative political principle thanks to the inter-
national collapse signalled by the downfall of the three ma-
jor multi-ethnic, multilinguistic empires (Austro-Hungar-
ian, Russian and Ottoman). However, this did not prevent 
him from thinking that a multi-ethnic state identified with 
one of the nations, which it prioritises over the others, 
would end up generating problems and tensions, even if it 
were a democratic state that was tolerant of minorities. Ul-
timately, however, he views the state evolution towards 
mono-culturalism as a historical trend which ends up in as-
similation or mass conversion from state imposition or, in 
the worst of cases, in mass expulsions of minorities, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide and forms of apartheid.
It seems proven that Hobsbawm added elements from 
practically all the members of the renegade group from 
the 1980s to support his theory of the nation and its de-
rivatives. He also shared with the majority of this group, 
which held progressive stances, a highly critical position 
towards the subject of study, a stance which they try to 
justify with historical contextualisation. We must surely 
situate Hobsbawm somewhere between the most critical 
and those who were more interested in carrying the anal-
ysis towards a critical vision of the late 20th century (to 
him, the period that was ushered in upon the collapse of 
the USSR). He argued that there was no new wave of na-
tional awareness, and that instead the new states had sim-
ply emerged from the collapse of the previous ones and 
were a consequence instead of a rupture. Hobsbawm was 
thus able to exonerate real socialism from the “historical 
sin” of not having been able to counter the old bourgeois 
nationalism (he cited the example of Estonia and Latvia, 
which had no national consciousness until 1917, but did 
in 1940 when faced with the Nazi presence in the region).
Everything led Hobsbawm to claim that the changes in 
political relations among the states and the national con-
sciousness in the late 20th century must be analysed in 
detail and with a great deal of caution. He claimed that it 
was natural to find these changes in Western Europe after 
the 1960s, and elsewhere fifteen or twenty years later, 
since they were the outcome of the quicker, more pro-
found and more universal transformation of human his-
tory in its entirety, and with it the disappearance of com-
munities’ traditional bonds, with the exception of the 
more residual and metaphorical capacity to define them-
selves. We are all uprooted people, he claimed, and this 
had led to the “nationalistic salvaging” quest for new 
identities. However, Hobsbawm always claims, these 
(highly varied) movements may be extremely vital but are 
also essentially negative.31 In the best of cases, they are a 
“cry of pain and a call for succour”, while in the worst of 
cases they are a blind protest by a hopeless people, yet al-
ways as manifestations which are presented with a revolu-
tionary appearance without offering any political solu-
tions. This cannot be confused with historical nationalism, 
Hobsbawm concludes.32
Between 2000 and 2004, Hobsbawm delivered a few 
lectures and talks in seminars on this topic. In Italy, they 
were compiled into a small volume with the telling title 
The End of the State.33 Thus, we can see that around that 
time he kept reaffirming the negative nature of the na-
tional movements at the end of the 20th century and, as 
we have just seen, the idea that they have nothing to do 
with historical nationalism.34 Here I shall cite the German 
Jewish sociologist Norbert Elias, who emigrated to Great 
Britain in 1938 and used his work The Civilising Process: 
Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations (1939) pro 
domo sua to note how the major crisis of the 20th century 
had interrupted the civilising process started at the end of 
the Middle Ages, stating once again, à la Gellner, that the 
aggregate effects of the individualisation of Western soci-
eties and capitalistic aggressiveness in the phase of glo-
balisation had generated a new need for national identity.
Perhaps Hobsbawm’s insistence on the idea of the ma-
jor rupture in the 1960s can end up being understood 
through the interpretation of his aforementioned history 
of the 20th century, originally entitled The Age of Ex-
tremes: The Short Twentieth Century (1914-1991) (1994). 
The common thread of his analysis was the clash between 
socialism and capitalism, while he relegated the internal 
contradictions of each of them to the background and 
“forgot” relevant aspects that did not fit within the narra-
tive scheme.35 Yet when writing after the collapse of 1991, 
his personal Marxist frustration led him to be somewhat 
critical of the drift of the 1917 Revolution and profoundly 
critical of the world that emerged from the “disaster” of 
1989-1991. These traits confirm Hobsbawm’s place 
among the scholars who are more progressive, cosmopol-
itan and critical of national movements, even though he 
views them as a prime problem in the contemporary age. 
And this wave of historiographic renovation in the 1980s 
is precisely what drew him into this field of historical 
study, in which he stands out around the world for his in-
disputable quality, magnificent prose and resonance.
A brief final reflection on the impact in the Catalan his-
toriography of the nation and the derivations of the Eng-
lish “renovation” in the 1980s. As we have seen, Hobs-
bawm more profited from than spearheaded this wave of 
new studies, yet he is one of the foreign authors cited the 
most frequently in Catalonia (along with Pierre Vilar). 
However, perhaps the issue is to evaluate whether beyond 
the citations, Hobsbawm and his renovating peers truly 
influenced the methods, concepts and approaches. In one 
of his usual hypercritical reflections on historiography it-
self, Enric Ucelay Da Cal (likely the historian living in 
Catalonia who follows new international developments 
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the most diligently) stated his opinion in 1995: “The the-
matic and methodological continuity, the scarce innova-
tion and the insistent recourse to empiricism – as a moral 
arbiter of a discipline lacking greater conceptual inspira-
tions – are key in the professional setting in Spain”.36 In 
this same introduction, he also speaks about methodo-
logical uniformity and an excess of empiricism, which he 
deems a “dead-end” if it does not come with a corre-
sponding conceptualisation. In line with Hobsbawm, this 
author thinks that the new studies on the nation have be-
come the “post-communist” issue par excellence in the 
social sciences, an aspect of which Catalan historiography 
was somewhat unaware given its traditional introspec-
tion. The same reflection gave a few clues as to the reason 
behind this Catalan resistance to methodological excesses 
and new developments: in Catalonia, there is a longstand-
ing tradition of studies on the nation which made it more 
resistant to change, and it trusted that the changes would 
pave the way for a Spanish historiography that was “dis-
covering” the à la mode importance of studies in this field 
right around that time.
At the start of the 1980s, the political culture of Cata-
lanism and the local historiography on the nation had ar-
rived, conditioned by the coexistence of long-standing 
lines and the impact of changes whose repercussions were 
difficult to determine. The long survival of Franco-era co-
ercion had distanced the national history from academia 
and, in a complementary fashion, fostered the history 
written abroad, an extremely rich stream since the Re-
naixença which in no way reflected the logics and flows 
common to academia. In the short term, the country had 
just achieved autonomy with the sublimation of the harsh 
anti-Franco struggle and the recovery of a missing histor-
ical trajectory which had allowed it to attain autonomy 
during the Second Republic. Therefore, the disparage-
ment of a supposed “invented tradition”, over imagina-
tions with the capacity to generate the state in a place 
where the state itself was a distant aspiration, or the con-
demnations over the incompatibility between national-
ism and the sound development of democratic individu-
alism, could not be very warmly welcomed or do much to 
change approaches and topics. 
It came in the 1980s when Catalonia had just five years 
of history in the university, little time to consolidate aca-
demic momentum, few journals and platforms to publish 
on and a local history written by scholars just cutting their 
teeth. It also arrived when the historiographic controver-
sy between Jordi Solé Tura and Josep Termes, which had 
been going on since 1974, was still underway.37 And it 
came with scant references to the international reflection 
on the topic.38 Precisely one of the events that did the 
most to facilitate the arrival of the theses of the innova-
tive, internationalist “renovators” was the political ten-
sions that arose after the electoral victory of Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya and Jordi Pujol in March 1980, 
a situation in which the 1974 controversy was renewed 
and even rendered utterly of the minute.39
However, we should say that the most important histo-
riographic controversies revolved around settling the is-
sue of romantic essentialism, the nationalistic euphoria 
sparked by the attainment of autonomy, the impoverish-
ment motivated by the constant clash with Hispanic es-
sentialism, but here without having a state of its own 
(“epic history” and “political fragility”) and disparagingly 
condemning how the history made in Catalonia reflected 
“the current confusion of the political juncture” caused 
by “Pujolism” and the disinflation of the “popular-front” 
self-satisfaction of the 1960s and 1970s. The start of the 
questioning of Marxist state control in university depart-
ments did the rest. Historians like M. Barceló, E. Ucelay 
Da Cal and B. de Riquer expressed these disparaging con-
cerns, especially in the decade from 1982 to 1992.40
Just a few examples of this critical reaction in the study 
of nationalism promoted by the international revision of 
the 1980s lead us to cite, perhaps first, J. M. Colomer and 
his selection entitled Espanyolisme i catalanisme. La idea 
de nació en el pensament polític català (1939-1979) (1984). 
Even though its politological approach was quite tradi-
tional, the long introduction cites theoreticians like H. 
Kohn, Samir Amin, B. Azkin, E. H. Karr, F. Chabod, H. B. 
Davis, K. W. Deutsch, G. Haupt, Löwy and Weill, T. 
Nairn, A. D. Smith, J. Surrateau and F. Tönnies. However, 
no reference is made to the existence of new approaches 
in the study of the nation (which also extends to national-
ity, fatherland, people and country in the book).
The works by J. M. Fradera41 and J. L. Marfany42 were 
aware that the renovation of the 1980s entailed the possi-
bility of responding to the “traditionalism” (“essentialism” 
it was called) implicit in previous studies on Catalanism. 
Fradera explained the desire to join the Catalan debate on 
the origin of Catalanism and to give it a few new ways to 
examine the issue. On the very first page, he cites Hobs-
bawm’s Nations and Nationalism, just released in 1990. 
Since his real goal was to refute the essentialism of Termes’ 
thesis, from this book he extracted the reference to the 
“popular proto-nationalism” within the framework of the 
bourgeois cultures of Europe in the 19th century, a theory 
that had been set forth by A. Colin. Thus, Fradera was able 
to argue that he was making a romantic transposition, giv-
en that Hobsbawm had proven that the underclasses were 
only the passive carriers of an ethnic stock that could only 
be manifested after the bourgeois had “manufactured” the 
nation and nationalist movements. Fradera also referred 
to B. Anderson when discussing the very invention of the-
ories by the leading class which were displaced from the 
urban nuclei (identified with the liberal bourgeoisie) to 
more backwards places.
Marfany’s book had a greater impact in the history of 
literature (such as in Jordi Castellanos) than in history 
tout curt. Borja de Riquer described him as “fairly dis-
putable” and in 1996 offered a series of reflections in 
which he stated that in Catalonia, historians tended to 
avoid interpretative theories and distance themselves 
from the interdisciplinary theoretical reflections which 
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had been affecting European historiography since the 
early 1980s.43
But before all this, a French historian like Pierre Vilar, a 
Marxist like Hobsbawm and the author of an emblematic 
book like Catalunya dins l’Espanya moderna. Recerques 
sobre els fonaments econòmics de les estructures nacionals 
– French edition from 1962 and Catalan version from 
1964-1968 – declared that between 1250 and 1350, the 
Principality of Catalonia may have been the European 
country about which it would be the least inaccurate, the 
least hazardous (sic) to pronounce apparently anachro-
nistic terms like political-economic imperialism or na-
tion-state. Vilar claimed that the political creation of Cat-
alonia in the Middle Ages was remarkable in that it came 
so early. Language, territory, economic life, psychic 
makeup, community of culture: the essential conditions 
of the nations had all been in perfect place since the 13th 
century, and it was not even lacking a concern with the 
market, “the school where the bourgeoisie learns nation-
alism”, a phrase with which Pierre Vilar sought to para-
phrase Stalin’s 1913 essay on Marxism and the national 
question. Regarding the contemporary era, the distinc-
tion between state and nation is a step in Catalan political 
thinking which Pierre Vilar claims has a universal value. 
At a lecture delivered in Paris in 1988, when distinguish-
ing between state and nation, Vilar denied the historical 
need to convert the nation into state and deemed the de-
nial of national realities that have not become states in the 
contemporary era, one of the prejudices of Hobsbawm 
and his followers, unjustified.44
Along the same lines as Pierre Vilar, Josep Fontana has 
continued the reflection in his latest book La formació 
d’una identitat. Una història de Catalunya, which was 
published in 2014. Fontana concludes that in the mid-
14th century, Catalonia had achieved the political and fis-
cal structure of a modern nation state just as Holland 
would three centuries later. However, being ahead of the 
times in this way has its own disadvantages when faced 
first with the major crisis in the late Middle Ages and later 
with the authoritarianism of the Spanish Hapsburg kind, 
with Catalonia boxed in between two large states, Spain 
and France, which were rivals but identical in their zeal to 
devour it. The visions set forth by Vilar and Fontana, two 
Marxist historians, are opposed to those of Hobsbawm. A 
universal theory has to pass the test of the particular case, 
and the case of Catalonia, which has been studied by his-
torians with ideological conceptions similar to those of 
Hobsbawm, contradicts the British historian’s general in-
terpretation. Firstly, without an earlier, longstanding, his-
torical popular base, it is impossible to “invent” the na-
tion. Secondly, the underpinnings of the national 
emancipation movement can be found in periods long 
before the contemporary era. Thirdly, the distinction of a 
national identity is not necessarily xenophobic: it can be 
associated with a democratic process and may seek the in-
tegration of new arrivals without leading to their class al-
ienation.
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